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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the relationship between two decisions shaping the organizational configuration of a 
firm: whether to make the upstream resources more general and deployable to more markets (vs. keeping 
them tailored to a few markets), and whether to trade with downstream firms as an upstream supplier of 
intermediate products and services (vs. directly entering downstream markets). While the literature has 
looked at these two decisions separately, we argue that they depend on each other. This has the important 
implication that they can generate organizational complementarities, inducing firms to implement them 
jointly. We are motivated in particular by the observation that an increasing number of firms invest in 
general upstream resources and exploit them as upstream suppliers of intermediate services or products— 
a strategy that we refer to as specialization in generality. Interestingly, the literature following the seminal 
work by Penrose (1959) and Nelson (1959) has highlighted the use of general upstream resources to enter 
new downstream markets. We identify the supply and demand conditions under which specialization in 
generality is instead more likely to emerge: lack of prior downstream assets, on the supply side, and a 
roughly equal distribution of buyers across intermediate markets (a “broad” demand), on the demand side. 
We test our predictions using a sample of firms in the U.S. laser industry between 1993 and 2001. A 
regulatory shock that increases the value of trading relative to downstream entry provides the setting for a 
quasi-natural experiment, which corroborates our theoretical predictions. 
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Introduction 
Upstream resources such as technological knowledge are the essence of a firm’s opportunity set. These 
resources are typically scale-free and as such generate “excess” capacity that can be used at zero or low 
cost in multiple businesses (Levinthal and Wu 2010), extending “the productive possibilities that” the 
firm’s managers “see and take advantage of” (Penrose 1959, p. 28). However, not all upstream resources 
are equally deployable across diverse settings. Some are specific to certain applications, and others are 
more easily reconfigured for alternative uses, such that they produce higher excess capacity potentially 
deployable in multiple businesses (Helfat and Eisenhardt 2004). This characteristic is referred to as the 
generality, general-purpose nature (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995), or fungibility (e.g., Kim and Bettis 
2014) of an upstream resource.
 
 
A leading argument in the resource-based view theory of entry and diversification is that entry into 
new downstream markets is the dominant option for taking advantage of a general upstream resource 
stock (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988, Penrose 1959, Teece 1980). However, an emergent literature in 
economics and organizational theory emphasizes the increasing importance of vertical disintegration and 
the emergence of intermediate markets, whereby upstream suppliers provide intermediate products and 
services to downstream firms (e.g., Arora et al. 2001, Baldwin and Clark 2000, Dushnitsky and Klueter 
2017, Jacobides and Winter 2005, Kapoor and Adner 2012, Moeen and Agarwal 2017). The existence of 
intermediate markets naturally expands the options for using a general upstream resource stock. General 
resources could in fact be exploited not only via direct entry into new downstream markets but also via 
trading in the corresponding intermediate markets. The presence of intermediate markets also changes the 
incentives to invest in the generality of the upstream resource stock. Absent intermediate markets, only 
those few firms that control the costly assets for entering and operating downstream will find investing in 
the generality of upstream resources attractive (Nelson 1959). However, when trading in intermediate 
markets is a viable option, investment in a general upstream resource stock might appeal to a larger pool 
of firms, including those interested in operating as upstream suppliers only (Bresnahan and Gambardella 
1998). 
Based on these considerations, we maintain that two decisions are endogenous to each other and 
therefore jointly taken by firms: whether (a) to invest (vs. not invest) in general upstream resources and 
whether (b) to trade in intermediate markets (vs. directly entering downstream). In doing so we depart 
from literature that takes as exogenous either the level of upstream resource generality (e.g., Penrose 
1959) or the exploitation mode of upstream resources, whether via entry (e.g., Nelson 1959) or trading 
(Bresnahan and Gambardella 1998). We build on the intuition that some supply and demand conditions 
generate complementarity between the activities of investing in general upstream resources and of trading 
as upstream suppliers of intermediate products or services. Firms facing such conditions will likely 
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undertake both these activities together (Milgrom and Roberts 1990), pursuing a strategy that we refer to 
as specialization in generality.
1
 
On the supply side, the complementarity between investing in generality (vs. not investing) and 
trading (vs. entering downstream) depends on whether firms own downstream assets and capabilities that 
is reusable in new downstream markets (Teece 1986). On the demand side, this complementarity depends 
on the distribution of downstream firms across markets. Downstream firms represent potential buyers of 
intermediate products and services. Hence, we refer to “broad” demand for intermediate products and 
services to describe the case of several equally relevant downstream markets, each populated by a similar 
number of downstream firms. We refer to “deep” demand to describe a situation of few large markets 
populated by most firms (Bresnahan and Gambardella 1998). 
To test our theoretical predictions, we empirically assess how firms that do not have downstream 
assets and capabilities (vs. firms that own them) and firms facing a broader (vs. deeper) demand respond 
to a shock that increases the value of trading in intermediate markets relative to the value of entry in 
downstream markets. There is evidence for complementarity if, when the value of trading vis-à-vis entry 
increases, firms are not only more likely to trade but also more likely to invest in resource generality. 
We offer a first empirical test of our theoretical framework based on a sample of firms in the U.S. 
laser industry between 1993 and 2001, which is an ideal empirical setting because it satisfies some 
necessary conditions for our theory to be valid. First, the crucial upstream resource in this industry is the 
technological know-how for producing the laser technology itself. This know-how can be more or less 
general as connected to laser technologies having a higher or lower number of applications (each linked to 
a specific downstream market). Second, in the laser industry, specialized and integrated firms coexist, 
with some firms vertically specializing upstream in the production of lasers (stand-alone intermediate 
technologies), some firms specializing downstream in the production of laser systems (“ready to use” 
downstream products), and some firms doing both. This implies that, in this context, intermediate markets 
exist and work smoothly. Such industry conditions are obviously necessary but not sufficient for 
observing firms’ specialization in generality, which is a strategy that individual firms choose on the basis 
of firm-specific contingencies. As we said, in the current study we identify two of these contingencies: 
                                                          
1
 We use the term specialization in generality as a tribute to George Stigler’s (1951) account of the importance of 
“general specialties,” i.e., general activities “(like shipping, railroads, banking, etc.) that are not closely attached to 
any one industry” (p. 192) and that, therefore, tend to be associated with vertical specialization. According to 
Stigler, the extraordinary economic growth of 19th century England occurred thanks to companies that vertically 
specialized in trading the services of products deriving from those general activities with other companies. We use 
the term specialization in generality to define firms’ choice of vertically specializing in trading the products or 
services deriving from a general upstream resource stock in intermediate markets.  
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supply characteristics (lack vs. presence of downstream assets) and the demand characteristics (breadth 
vs. depth of demand) the firm is facing. 
Finally, during our sample period, an exogenous regulatory shock affecting U.S. firms increased the 
relative value of trading in intermediate markets versus entering downstream markets (by increasing the 
cost of the latter activity relative to the former activity). We use this shock to test our hypotheses on the 
complementarity between investing in the know-how for producing more general lasers (vs. not investing) 
and trading these lasers in intermediate markets (vs. entering downstream markets). Our difference-in-
difference analysis tests whether firms located in states enacting a regulation—our treatment group—that 
increases production costs in downstream markets are more likely to specialize in generality than firms in 
the other states—our control group. We employ both bivariate probit and linear probability models for the 
four possible strategies defined by the choice of investing versus not investing in general upstream 
resources, on one hand, and trading in intermediate markets versus entering in downstream markets, on 
the other hand. We find results consistent with our predictions. 
Overall, our work offers a theoretical as well as an empirical contribution. From a theoretical point 
of view, this paper contributes to the organizational research on vertical integration and disintegration 
(e.g., Jacobides and Winter 2005, Argyres and Zenger 2012), showing how the decision about a firm’s 
vertical scope cannot be isolated from the decision about investment in different types of upstream 
resources and capabilities. Furthermore, showing that there might be complementarity between these two 
decisions is important for organizational research scholars who are interested in understanding how a 
strategy can emerge and persist as a result of complementarity between organizational activities (e.g., 
Galbraith 1973, Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Thompson 1967). In this respect, this paper emphasizes two 
conditions determining whether investment in general resources is exploited via vertical integration or via 
upstream vertical specialization. The corresponding different strategies have not been systematically 
studied by prior research. Finally, from an empirical point of view, the realization that two activities are 
jointly chosen by firms (and so depend on each other) suggests the importance of overcoming the natural 
estimation bias that arises by considering either the former or the latter activity as exogenous. For 
instance, studies analyzing firm entry in a new market as a function of the generality of the firm resource 
stock should adopt an appropriate identification strategy (e.g., instrumental variables) to obtain reliable 
estimates. 
 
Specialization in Generality as a Distinct Firm Strategy 
General upstream resources generate an impetus toward the division of labor and vertical disintegration in 
the economy (Rosenberg, 1982). Indeed, such general resources generate services and products used by a 
wide variety of downstream firms in different industries, which fosters the emergence of a class of 
 6 
companies investing in general upstream resources and trading them in intermediate markets (Bresnahan 
and Gambardella 1998). We define the strategy pursued by such companies as specialization in generality 
(see also Conti et al. 2018).  
Specialization in generality has not been explicitly recognized as a strategy by extant research. For 
instance, the innovation literature has usually considered firms’ decision to trade in intermediate markets 
for technology and their decision to invest in technology generality as independent and, as a result, has 
investigated them separately. A first stream of literature has focused only on firms’ decision to trade 
resources in intermediate markets versus entering downstream. The gist of this research is that this 
decision should be taken based on firms’ comparative strength. Hence, some firms (namely the small and 
entrepreneurial ones) are better off specializing in the production of technologies and trading them in 
intermediate markets. Other firms (namely the large and established ones) should buy technologies in 
intermediate markets and embed such technologies into downstream products (e.g., Arora et al. 2001, 
Gans and Stern 2003, Teece 1986).  
A second stream of literature has focused only on firms’ investment in general technological 
resources (called general-purpose technologies, or GPTs). Most of this research has taken a social-welfare 
perspective and investigated the supply or demand configurations that determine a socially optimal 
investment in GPTs (e.g., Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995, Bresnahan and Gambardella 1998). However, 
research in this stream has not considered the individual firm perspective. It has therefore overlooked the 
reason why firms invest in general technology in the first place, either for trading in intermediate markets 
or for entering downstream. Some attempts to link these two literature streams have been made. For 
instance, both Gambardella and McGahan (2010) and Gambardella and Giarratana (2013) argue that 
general technological resources represent a great opportunity for small and young firms aimed at trading 
in intermediate markets. Yet, such work has not considered the interdependence between resource 
generality and the decision to use such generality via trading or entry. 
The interdependence between firms’ resources and vertical scope has been studied by a research 
stream within the organizational and strategy literature (e.g., Argyres and Zenger 2012, Jacobides and 
Winter 2005). Contributions in this area, for instance, have elaborated on the relationship between the 
superiority of resources possessed by a firm and its vertical scope (Jacobides and Winter 2005). Or they 
have focused on the unique complementarity between a focal resource and the bundle of resources 
already possessed by firms as the core force leading to vertical integration (Argyres and Zenger 2012). 
However, these studies have neglected the generality of a firm’s resource stock as a factor determining 
firms’ vertical scope, beyond the firms’ resource-stock superiority (Jacobides and Winter 2005), or 
internal complementarity (Argyres and Zenger 2012). Even more importantly, these works have 
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considered firms’ extant resource stock as exogenous, at least in the short term, rather than the outcome 
itself of a strategic choice.  
However, whether to invest (or not) in upstream resource generality and whether to trade the 
services or products deriving from these resources in intermediate markets (vs. use them to enter 
downstream) are endogenous and interrelated choices, generating potential complementarities. As such, 
they are likely to be jointly taken by firms as part of a cohesive strategy. The strategy this paper focuses 
on, specialization in generality, emerges when firms simultaneously choose to invest in upstream resource 
generality and to trade in intermediate markets because there is complementarity among the two 
activities. Several cases of this strategy can be identified. For instance, the most valuable resource that 
IDEO—a leading design company known for pioneering a new business model—has invested in is the 
overall procedural knowledge for designing new ideas. This knowledge was developed to be extremely 
general, such that it could lead to developing products in multiple downstream market domains such as 
electronics, robotics, and apparel. However, IDEO has not entered these downstream markets. Doing so 
would have required downstream assets and capabilities that are costly and time-consuming to develop, 
generating considerable diseconomies of scope for IDEO, which began as a small company with no 
downstream assets or capabilities. By taking advantage of corporate downsizing in the 1990s and the 
creation of “markets for designing,” IDEO traded in intermediate markets the services coming from its 
procedural and general knowledge, offering design services to several companies operating in several 
downstream markets (such as Apple, AT&T, Samsung, Philips, Amtrak, Steelcase, Baxter International, 
and NEC Corporation). 
Similarly, Echelon, an industrial automation company, developed technological knowledge about a 
universal automated control system (LonWorks) with applications in sectors as diverse as elevators, 
manufacturing processes, cars, and utilities (Thoma 2009). Because of the high costs of entering and 
operating in these downstream markets, the company chose not to enter any of them, focusing instead on 
increasing the generality of its controller and expanding its span of applications to trade its product in 
intermediate markets (Gambardella and McGahan 2010). 
Even the transformation of IBM from a mainframe-computer producer to a service-based firm, 
offering its general knowledge to other companies operating in multiple businesses, might be seen as an 
example of our specialization-in-generality strategy. IBM operated in downstream markets in the early 
1990s. However, the rise of both UNIX (the open system environment developed by Sun and HP) and the 
personal computer challenged IBM’s downstream position in mainframes (Bresnahan et al.2012, 
Christensen 1997, Gans 2016), rendering the company’s downstream assets and capabilities obsolete. 
IBM responded to this shock by simultaneously investing in more general upstream resources capabilities 
(reinforcing its upstream IT-based capability to solve complex business problems in different contexts) 
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and selling the services deriving from this general capability in intermediate markets to firms operating in 
different downstream sectors (Rothaermel et al. 2016). As Louis Gerstner (2002, p. 123), the CEO who 
engineered this transformation between 1993 and 2002, puts it: “We decided to stake the company’s 
future on a totally different view of the industry.” This “totally different view” could be considered an 
instance of specialization in generality. 
Whereas the above companies operate in highly innovative industries, the choice about whether to 
“specialize in generality” (to invest in general resources and trade them in intermediate markets) is also 
faced by companies in more traditional sectors. Consider the steel industry. There are different types of 
steel, having unique physical, chemical, and environmental properties, which present different degrees of 
generality. For example, stainless steels are usually general in that they can be used in household 
hardware, surgical instruments, automotive, aerospace, and construction; maraging steels or weathering 
steels are instead much less general, as they are mainly used in aerospace and architecture, respectively. 
In this context, some steel producers, such as Acerinox, have decided to invest exclusively in the 
knowledge and assets needed to produce and trade the former (more general) versus the latter steel types; 
in other words, they have specialized in generality. 
However, investment in general resources is not always associated with upstream vertical 
specialization and trading. Rather, some companies see generality as an opportunity to enter multiple 
downstream markets, consistent with the classical view of general resources as an option for downstream 
entry and diversification (e.g., Penrose 1959). For example, steel firms such as ArcelorMittal and Nucor 
have utilized their knowledge in general steel production to invest in downstream operations such as 
building and construction (ArcelorMittal 2009). Similarly, in a different setting, 3M has used its general 
technological knowledge about adhesive technologies to vertically integrate into some industries where 
those adhesive technologies were applicable, such as the home care and cleaning, home improvement, 
home office and school supplies, and personal health care sectors. 
Thus, the goal of our paper is to understand the conditions under which companies invest in general 
upstream resources and exploit such generality not to enter new downstream markets but rather to trade 
the resulting services or products in intermediate markets. In other words, we aim to identify the 
conditions that are conducive to complementarity between investment in the generality of upstream 
resources and vertical specialization via trading in intermediate markets (rather than between investment 
in upstream resource generality and entry into new downstream markets). This approach underscores that 
our paper claims not that specialization in generality is a dominant strategy but rather that, under certain 
conditions, investing in general upstream resources and trading in intermediate markets are 
complementary choices. Under these conditions, firms will then specialize in generality. 
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Theoretical Development 
Consider a firm that faces an opportunity to tap into some markets and is considering how to exploit this 
opportunity. The most obvious decision such a firm should make is whether to exploit these markets by 
entering downstream or by trading in the corresponding intermediate markets. However, to tap into a 
larger number of markets, such a firm might also decide to expand the generality of its upstream resource 
stock by investing in a scale-free general resource, whose application in one specific market would not 
preclude in any way its simultaneous application in the other markets. This characteristic could make 
investing in a unique scale-free general resource—applicable to several markets—more convenient than 
investing in multiple market-specific resources (Levinthal and Wu 2010).  
Potential applicability of a general upstream resource to several markets does not imply actual 
monetization in those markets, though. Actual monetization requires commercially exploiting these 
resources (by trading in intermediate markets or entering downstream markets). This makes the decision 
about whether to invest or not in more general upstream resources interdependent with the decision about 
how to commercially exploit these resources. Hence, the two activities on which this firm must make 
simultaneous decisions—possibly generating complementarities—are (i) whether to invest (vs. not invest) 
to increase the generality of its upstream resource stock,
2
 and (ii) whether to sell the intermediate products 
or services deriving from these upstream resources to downstream firms (vs. using such resources to enter 
into downstream markets themselves). This framework generates a typology of four possible firm 
strategies, each resulting from a specific combination of the two decisions and generating a peculiar 
payoff (Table 1). 
***** Insert Table 1 about here ***** 
Two considerations are important in developing this typology and understanding the payoffs to 
firms from the four strategies. First, it is plausible to assume that when intermediate markets exist, the 
natural alternative to downstream entry into a new market is to trade as a supplier in the corresponding 
intermediate market—rather than pure no entry.3 Indeed, when intermediate markets work smoothly, 
trading in these markets is generally valuable because it does not require substantial investments in 
                                                          
2
 We assume that generality ranges on a continuum such that even firms that start with a general resource stock 
might still enhance the level of generality. 
3
 The choice of entering new downstream markets does not exclude, in principle, some trading in the corresponding 
intermediate markets. Yet, the returns from trading are likely to be limited for firms that operate downstream, for 
instance because of a “rent dissipation” effect: selling resources to firms in the same market (likely competitors) 
reinforces the competitor’s position (Arora et al. 2001). Moreover, buyers may not be inclined to buy intermediate 
products from a competitor. Therefore, in the rest of the article, we consider trading and entering as two choices that, 
in each market, are mutually exclusive. 
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complementary assets and capabilities (Arora et al. 2001). In this sense, the zero-return option of not 
entering is dominated by trading, and it can safely be ruled out in our theoretical development. 
Second, firms face a trade-off when deciding to invest in general upstream resources because 
although these resources tend to be applicable to a higher number of markets, the value they can generate 
in each specific market is lower than that for a more specialized resource (e.g., Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt 1988). While a more general upstream resource is adaptable to a larger number of markets, it 
is less perfectly tuned to each individual market (e.g., Bresnahan and Gambardella 1998). Therefore, 
firms take into account that the returns from either trading in intermediate markets or entering 
downstream markets change according to the degree of upstream resource generality. 
In particular, consider how the returns of trading vary according to the generality of the upstream 
resource stock. Firms might choose to trade while keeping (or even decreasing) the current generality of 
the upstream resource stock (investment in generality = 0; trading = 1), such that they can only trade in a 
limited number of intermediate markets. The returns of this strategy are the profits ПT obtained by serving 
a relatively low number of intermediate markets, but with an upstream resource stock tailored to each 
market. Alternatively, firms might “specialize in generality” (investment in generality = 1; trading = 1). 
The returns are the profits ПTG obtained from trading the services or products deriving from a more 
general resource stock in a higher number of intermediate markets, but at a lower average profitability. 
Such decrease could be due to the cost of market-specific adjustments required to tailor a more general 
upstream resource stock to each specific market—which will make the buyer indifferent between buying 
the services or products provided by a more general versus a more dedicated resource stock. Or it can be 
determined by the lower price that the seller of the services or products of a more general upstream 
resource stock should accept—again, to make the buyer indifferent between the services or products 
provided by a more general versus a more dedicated resource stock.  
Similar to the returns from trading, the returns from entry vary with the generality of the upstream 
resource stock. Firms might enter downstream markets while keeping unaltered (or even decreasing) the 
generality of their current resource stock (investment in generality = 0; trading = 0). This strategy’s 
payoff corresponds to the profits ПE of entering a limited number of markets with a less general upstream 
resource stock, which however raises profitability in each market in which the firm enters. Firms might 
instead enter multiple downstream markets thanks to investment in upstream resource generality 
(investment in generality = 1; trading = 0). The payoff from this strategy is equal to the profits ПEG 
obtained by entering a high number of markets with lower returns in each due to the higher generality of 
the upstream resource stock. 
Assuming that firms are rational and understand the value of undertaking complementary activities, 
we will observe firms adopting a specialization-in-generality strategy in any circumstance where the 
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value of investing in greater generality of the upstream resource stock is higher when trading in 
intermediate markets than when entering downstream markets. That is, whenever (ПTG − ПT)  (ПEG − 
(ПE).4 We suggest that whether this inequality holds depends on firms’ assets and capabilities (on the 
supply side) and on specific intermediate demand configurations (on the demand side).  
In particular, on the supply side, one factor that affects this inequality is whether firms already 
possess or not downstream assets and capabilities that can be reused when entering new downstream 
markets (Teece 1986). This will have an effect on (ПEG − ПE), the incremental return of entering 
downstream by investing in upstream resource generality. To generate value downstream, firm upstream 
resources (e.g., technological knowledge) need to be combined with downstream assets and capabilities 
(e.g., production, marketing, and distribution) that cannot be acquired overnight (Moeen and Agarwal 
2017). For firms entering downstream markets for the first time, handling the complexity associated with 
entry in multiple markets at once is particularly difficult and costly (Qian et al. 2012). Due to these 
diseconomies of scope, firms with no prior downstream assets have no incentive to invest in generality for 
entering multiple downstream markets: for them, the difference between ПEG and ПE is likely to be low or 
even negative. By contrast, firms that already have downstream assets and capabilities are more likely to 
enjoy economies of scope when entering additional markets by investing in general upstream resources. 
Like the established corporation described by Penrose (1959) and Nelson (1959), these firms can reuse 
their extant downstream assets and capabilities in new downstream markets. By virtue of these 
downstream economies of scope, for firms with prior assets, investing in generality to enter multiple 
markets is a valuable option, as the difference (ПEG − ПE) is likely to be positive and high. 
At the same time, the presence or lack of downstream assets is unlikely to affect the value of 
trading in intermediate markets, and so is unlikely to have any effect on (ПTG − ПT). If anything, (ПTG − 
ПT) might be higher for firms that so far have been exclusively dedicated to trading in intermediate 
markets than for firms already active in downstream markets. The former companies, compared with the 
latter, are possibly better able to identify and adapt to the needs of buyers in different intermediate 
markets. Hence, companies with no downstream capabilities might have incentive to invest in generality 
to trade in multiple different intermediate markets. By contrast, firms that have been already operating 
                                                          
4
 We derive this consideration building on the basic definition of complementarity by Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 
p. 514): “the defining characteristic [. . .] of complements is that if the levels of any subset of activities are 
increased, then the marginal return to increases in any or all of the remaining activities raises.” That is, when there 
are two activities A1 and A2, the function П(A1,A2), which defines the incremental profitability generated by 
adopting the two activities, is supermodular, and A1 and A2 are complements if and only if П(1,1) − П(0,1)  
П(1,0) − П (0,0). In our context, activity A1 is investing (vs. not investing) in upstream resource generality, and 
activity A2 is trading in intermediate markets (vs. entering downstream markets), such that the condition of 
complementarity between these two activities can be written as (ПTG − ПT)  (ПEG − (ПE).   
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downstream might not be able to understand and address the needs of buyers in different intermediate 
markets, because of their focus on final customers. For these companies, investing in generality for 
trading might therefore be worthless. 
To sum up, our arguments suggest that for firms without prior downstream assets, (ПEG – ПE) is 
likely to be lower than for firms with prior downstream assets—while (ПTG − ПT) is likely to be the same 
and, if anything, higher. Since the condition for complementarity between investing in generality and 
trading is for (ПTG − ПT) to be higher than (ПEG – ПE), our first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1. Firms with no prior downstream assets are more likely to exhibit complementarity between 
investing (vs. not investing) in general upstream resources and trading in intermediate markets (vs. 
entering downstream markets). Therefore, these firms are more likely to specialize in generality. 
Any firm, based on its resources and capabilities, can reach a certain portfolio of downstream 
markets, via either entry or trading. The downstream firms populating these markets constitute rivals, 
when the focal firm operates downstream, or potential buyers, when the focal firm trades in intermediate 
markets.  
In particular, the focal firm faces a “broad” intermediate demand when the markets it faces are 
populated by a similar number of firms and so are equally relevant; or a “deep” intermediate demand 
when it faces a few large markets where most buyers concentrate (Bresnahan and Gambardella 1998). 
However, the configuration of the intermediate demand is not stable. Rather, it usually changes, for 
instance because downstream firms move across markets to tap into new opportunities. These changes 
have natural implications for the focal firm’s strategic choices.  
We argue that an increase in the breadth versus depth of intermediate demand is likely to have a 
positive influence on (ПTG − ПT), the incremental profits obtained by investing in generality for trading. 
An increase in breadth of the intermediate demand corresponds to a situation in which downstream firms 
(the potential buyers of intermediate products or services) tend to spread evenly across multiple markets, 
which are therefore becoming similar in size. In this situation, investing in generality allows addressing 
the diverse needs of buyers operating in different but equally relevant markets. A decrease in demand 
breadth corresponds to the opposite situation in which downstream firms get more concentrated in a few 
relevant markets. In this situation, an investment in generality for trading would be less convenient. It 
would allow reaching a higher number of intermediate markets, but in a context where most of these 
markets are becoming less populated by potential buyers and so less relevant. Moreover, the wider reach 
associated with higher generality would come at the expense of a lower fit with the few most populated 
and valuable markets. Thus, (ПTG − ПT) is likely to increase when demand becomes broader. 
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An increase in the breadth of intermediate demand is likely to have a similar but less marked effect 
on (ПEG − ПE), the incremental profits obtained by investing in generality for entering. When downstream 
firms tend to equally spread across markets (and so intermediate demand becomes broader), all 
downstream markets are likely to become similarly attractive from an entrant’s point of view. So, 
investing in generality is useful to entering as many of those equally relevant markets as possible. By 
contrast, when downstream firms tend to move into few markets (and so intermediate demand becomes 
deeper), these few markets are likely the most attractive for entry. It therefore makes sense to keep the 
upstream resources tailored to those few most valuable markets. Thus, when downstream firms become 
more spread across markets and the intermediate demand becomes broader, (ПEG − ПE) increases. Yet, 
this increase is likely to be more limited than the corresponding increase in (ПTG − ПT). Different from 
trading, entry in any new market implies investing in some market-specific downstream complementary 
assets. The costs associated with such investment restrict the possibility of actually entering in all markets 
potentially reached by a general upstream resource stock.  
To sum up, when downstream firms spread across several markets and thus the intermediate 
demand becomes broader, investing in generality might be convenient both for firms trading and for those 
entering downstream. However, the returns from entry in multiple downstream markets are bounded by 
the cost of investing in market-specific downstream assets, whereas the returns from trading in multiple 
intermediate markets are not. Hence, with greater demand breadth, (ПTG − ПT) increases more than (ПEG 
− ПE). This leads us to hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2. Firms facing an increase in the breadth of demand in intermediate markets are more likely 
to exhibit complementarity between investing (vs. not investing) in general upstream resources and 
trading in intermediate markets (vs. entering downstream markets). Therefore, these firms are more likely 
to specialize in generality. 
 
Data and Empirics 
Empirical Setting 
Our theory is potentially applicable to industries in which the following key conditions hold: (a) there are 
scale-free upstream resources (e.g., technological knowledge) that firms can invest in, possibly to increase 
the generality of their upstream resource stock; (b) there is the possibility of exploiting new markets; and 
(c) such new markets can be exploited either by direct entry or by trading with firms already active in 
those downstream markets, since the corresponding intermediate markets operate efficiently. These 
industry conditions are necessary but not sufficient for a firm adopting a specialization-in-generality 
strategy, in that such a choice is firm-specific and—as we explained in the theoretical part—likely 
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depends on firm-specific contingencies, including the lack of downstream assets and the intermediate 
demand structure that a firm faces. Hence, to offer a first test of our theory—and to verify whether the 
firm-specific conditions we have identified actually lead firms to specialize in generality—we have 
considered an industry in which the aforementioned conditions hold: the laser industry.  
We build a novel longitudinal data set containing information about a sample of U.S. firms active in 
the laser manufacturing industry over a nine-year period (1993–2001) that we complement with 
interviews of managers and industry experts. The term “laser”—“light amplification by stimulated 
emission of radiation”—refers to devices that emit light through a process of optical amplification based 
on the stimulated emission of electromagnetic radiation. Based on theoretical work by Charles Hard 
Townes and Arthur Leonard Schawlow, the first laser was built in 1960 by Theodore H. Maiman at 
Hughes Laboratories (Hecht 2011). 
All laser technologies comprise a set of standard components that include a lasing material (the gain 
medium), a pump source, and a laser cavity. The atoms of a material such as crystal, glass, liquid, dye, or 
gas are excited by the pump source to a semi-stable state so that lasing can be achieved. Usually, the 
pump source is another light source (e.g., a laser diode or flash lamp) or an electric discharge. The light 
emitted by an atom interacts with the excited atoms nearby as it drops back to the ground state. Identical 
pairs of photons are released in a process called stimulated emission. The process is further duplicated 
while the photons bounce back and forth in the cavity from mirrors or other reflective cavity structures. In 
this way, the light emission is further amplified and beams of light at specific frequencies are produced 
(Hecht 2011). 
Lasers differ in power and in the wavelength of light they emit, which has implications for their 
applications (and, thus, markets in which they can be applied). These include biomedical/medical (e.g., 
medical imaging, dermatology), information processing (e.g., scanning, optical disk reading), 
telecommunications (e.g., data transmission, pulse generation), military (e.g., target designation), and 
industrial (e.g., cutting, welding, marking) applications. 
As noted, the laser industry is an ideal setting to test our theory, for several reasons. First, the 
industry has a clear vertical structure: upstream technological knowledge can be used to produce either 
lasers (intermediate components) or ready-to-use laser systems (downstream products). In fact, the laser 
industry has been characterized, since its inception, by a significant division of labor between firms 
specializing in producing laser technologies and firms producing laser systems by embedding the laser 
technologies into final products. This specialization was enhanced by the inherent general-purpose nature 
of the laser technology, which can be applied to several industries. This is consistent with Klepper (1997), 
who considers laser industry patterns using data from the annual Buyers’ Guide of Laser Focus for the 
period 1966–1994—where the year 1966 roughly corresponds to the origins of the laser industry, since 
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the first laser was built in 1960 (Hecht 2011). Despite the specialization being marked, it is not complete: 
specialized and integrated firms coexist, with some firms vertically specializing upstream in the 
production of lasers, some firms specializing downstream in the production of laser systems, and some 
firms doing both. This industry is therefore an ideal empirical setting for studying the conditions that lead 
firms to use general resources just for trading versus entering downstream.  
Second, technological knowledge is a scale-free resource, which, once acquired, can be applied in 
multiple contexts at the same time. Firms vary in the generality of their upstream technological 
knowledge. Some firms have more general upstream technological knowledge (and thus produce lasers 
for use in a large number of laser systems for different markets). Others have less general upstream 
technological knowledge (and thus produce lasers targeted to specific downstream applications and 
related downstream markets). 
Third, in the period studied, the applications of lasers expanded considerably in new downstream 
markets, such that firms in the laser industry faced precisely the choice of whether to enter these new 
markets by direct entry or by trading in the corresponding intermediate markets. Interestingly for our 
analysis, the directory we use for data collection is meant to be an outlet for firms to advertise their lasers 
and/or laser systems. Hence, by construction, if a firm is reported in the directory, it is exploiting new 
markets either by trading as an upstream supplier of intermediate products (lasers) or by operating 
downstream (as a seller of laser system)—consistent with our theoretical framework. 
Finally, as we explain in the next section, in the period considered, we can exploit an exogenous 
regulatory shock affecting the relative value of trading in intermediate markets versus entering 
downstream markets. In so doing, we follow Brynjolfsson and Milgrom’s (2012, p. 58) suggestion that 
“legal and institutional changes are often ideal candidates to . . . [estimate complementarities in 
organizations] . . . because a change in a law or government policy can provide a precise date and specific 
geographic area or jurisdiction for the change to occur.” 
To define the laser industry and its boundaries, we rely on the Photonics directory by Laurin 
Publishing, which lists all companies active in the laser context. We select all U.S. companies listed in the 
directory as active in the laser industry between 1993 and 2001. The sample includes private and public 
firms; thus, it is generally representative of the different categories of firms active in high-technology 
contexts. It also includes firms that enter or exit the industry during the period, limiting any survival bias. 
We extract information on their characteristics (e.g., independence status, size, age, location) for each 
year. We use the same directory to collect information on the laser types that each firm is able to produce 
as well as on firm entry and trading. We pick our time window for empirical reasons: first, during the 
period 1993–2001 many U.S. states enacted laser safety regulations that increased the costs of operating 
in downstream markets—and we use those enactments as exogenous shocks. Second, during this period 
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the number of possible laser applications increased considerably due to the dramatic diffusion of the 
Internet. 
We also match the data from the directory with firms’ patent data. To obtain patent data, we use 
firms’ names and locations and match them to patent assignees’ names in the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) patents database. The NBER data set provides patent data consolidated at 
the parent-portfolio level for public firms. For private firms, we use the D&B Who Owns Whom database 
to build a list of their worldwide subsidiaries for each year of the study. We match this list with the NBER 
data set to obtain the list of patents filed by each of the firm’s subsidiaries and consolidate the list of 
patents at the parent-firm level. This procedure yields a sample of 204 firms corresponding to 783 firm-
year observations.
5
 
 
Methodology 
Testing our theory is not straightforward. The first and most obvious problem to address is that we cannot 
just take the correlation between investment in more general upstream resources and trading. It is well 
known that positive correlation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for complementarity (e.g., 
Bresnahan et al. 2002). To address this problem, we need a (plausibly exogenous) shock that affects either 
the value of investing in generality versus not investing or the relative value of trading in intermediate 
markets versus entering downstream markets, and we ought to observe how this shock affects the other 
choice. Indeed, when a set of activities complement each other, if the marginal returns associated with 
some activities increase (decrease) it will be optimal to increase (decrease) the level of all the activities 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990, p. 514). In the case of two discrete and complementary activities, we will 
naturally observe that a shock that makes one of the two activities more versus less convenient will lead 
firms to find the other activity more or less attractive also. 
In our empirical analysis, we employ a shock that raises the costs of operating downstream and 
which, therefore, increases the value of trading in intermediate markets relative to the value of entering 
downstream markets. This implies that, as a direct response to this shock, firms will increase their trading 
in intermediate markets rather than enter downstream markets. Moreover, we expect that those firms for 
which trading in intermediate markets is complementary to investment in upstream resource generality 
(firms with no downstream assets and firms facing an equally spread distribution of potential buyers in 
intermediate markets) will also increase their investment in upstream resource generality compared with 
the counterfactual situation where the downstream costs stay constant. 
                                                          
5
 The laser industry exhibits low concentration; in particular, it is populated by many small and very small firms. 
Other studies have noted the low concentration of the laser industries, e.g., Sutton (1998) and Klepper and Sleeper 
(2005).  
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We identify an exogenous increase in downstream production costs by taking advantage of the fact 
that in the period under investigation, some U.S. states enacted laser safety regulations that increased the 
costs of downstream operations by establishing new rules that laser system manufacturers (firms 
operating downstream) must follow to reduce the risk of accidents. The laser industry is heavily regulated 
because laser technologies present potential hazards for individual users. In the United States, safety 
requirements are the product of federal regulatory agencies and some voluntary standards: the Laser 
Product Performance Standard of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, the American National 
Standards Institute, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Federal Aviation 
Administration. In addition to the federal and industry regulations, in the 1990s some U.S. states enacted 
local regulations to further increase laser safety controls (Rockwell and Parkinson 1999). 
The introduction of these state regulations increases the costs of producing downstream products 
but not (or less so) the costs of producing laser technologies not immediately usable without being 
embedded in a product. Indeed, it adds costly activities that only downstream firms producing laser 
systems (products directly usable by final customers and thus potentially more dangerous) in the state 
must comply with. For example, state regulations impose specific obligations for state firms 
manufacturing laser systems, including registration requirements and the payment of a registration fee 
(e.g., Massachusetts Radiation Control Program, sections 121.015 and 121.016; Illinois Laser System 
Act, section 30). They also oblige firms manufacturing laser systems to promptly report any injury to 
employees in the course of use, handling, operation, manufacture, or discharge of a laser system (e.g., 
Illinois Laser System Act, section 40). Finally, state laser system manufacturers are regularly inspected by 
state officers to ensure compliance with such state regulations (e.g., Massachusetts Radiation Control 
Program, section 121.024; Illinois Laser System Act, section 30). 
Similar requirements targeted at products embedding laser technologies are contained in the other 
state regulations, also in line with the information we received from the compliance specialist we 
interviewed. They clearly imply a cost for downstream companies producing laser systems within states 
enacting laser regulations. In general, an expert in laser compliance that we interviewed confirmed: “The 
State requirements [. . .] can be problematic and they can produce added costs [. . . ;] they come at it from 
a safety of use standpoint. [. . .] The State monitors very carefully, for the safety of the patients, that the 
equipment is compliant, they know where it is, they come and test it now and then, etc.” 
Note that the regulations we examined do not contain any specific reference to the generality or the 
specificity of the technology. Moreover, the rules set by these regulations usually regard all laser 
applications. However, laser systems designed for some applications that pose greater risk to individual 
customers (e.g., health care applications) are subjected to even more stringent regulations in some states 
(e.g., Massachusetts Radiation Control Program, section 121.006). 
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Importantly, whereas the firms operating in this industry sell lasers or laser systems throughout the 
country, or even internationally, they are mostly small to medium-sized firms: hence, they would hardly 
move their manufacturing from their own area or town because of an unfavorable regulation enactment—
which is confirmed by robustness checks we do later in the paper (see Table 13). In the period we 
considered (1993–2001) the new regulations were introduced by the states of New York (1994), Arizona 
(1996), Florida (1996), Massachusetts (1997), Illinois (1997), and Texas (1999). Because those 
regulations are introduced in different years, in our panel the shock is not a mere chronological threshold. 
Moreover, accounts of the regulations’ enactment suggest that they were exogenous to the economic and 
political conditions of each state (Rockwell and Parkinson 1999). We also corroborate the exogeneity of 
our shock in our robustness checks. 
We assess the effect of our shock by comparing firms in states that enacted such regulations, our 
treatment group, with firms in states that did not, our control group. In particular, our treatment is the 
variable Downstream production cost, a dummy equal to 1 for firms operating in a state that introduced 
the regulation after its enactment, and 0 otherwise. Since we control for year fixed effects and we 
introduce state dummies—besides clustering the error at the state level as suggested by Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003)—our approach is a classical diff-in-diff regression, where the coefficient of 
Downstream production cost produces an estimate of the impact of an increase in downstream production 
costs on the outcome of interest.
6
 
In particular, our dependent variable Specialization in generality is the joint occurrence of two 
events: (1) the focal firm invests in more general upstream resources, and (2) it trades in intermediate 
markets (rather than entering downstream markets). Considering again Table 1, our main dependent 
variable is the strategy that the focal firm pursued in each period of the four possible strategies identified. 
These strategies are defined by all possible combinations of undertaking (or not) each of the two activities 
(investment in upstream resource generality and trading in intermediate markets). The most appropriate 
way to estimate a joint likelihood of undertaking or not two activities is through a bivariate probit; 
however, as a robustness check, we also use a linear probability model. 
To measure whether a firm exploits its resources by trading in intermediate markets rather than 
entering downstream, we use Trading in intermediate markets, a dummy equal to 1 if in year t the firm 
exploits any new market where laser technology could in principle be applied in the focal period (e.g., 
communication, information processing, industrial, medical, military, miscellaneous) by trading rather 
than entering. Specifically, the industry directory that we used indicates whether, in each year, each of the 
                                                          
6
 A reliable estimate is obtained even when using, as we do here, a nonlinear estimation model (Puhani 2012): in this 
case the coefficient estimating the treatment effect is still a valid indicator of the actual treatment effect. At any rate, 
we also use linear models as robustness checks. 
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firms produces and sells lasers to downstream firms (trades the upstream resource in intermediate 
markets) versus (also) producing and selling laser systems (the downstream product). Hence, for each of 
the years in our sample, we gave the variable Trading in intermediate markets the value 1 if the directory 
indicated that the focal firm was selling lasers to downstream firms and 0 if the directory indicated instead 
that the focal firm entered downstream and also began producing and selling a laser system in a new 
market.
7
  
To measure Investment in general upstream resources, we take advantage of the fact that laser 
technology has several possible market applications depending on the laser medium.
8
 Based on the 
medium, lasers can be classified in the following categories: Alexandrite; ArF; Argon-Ion; CO2; CO2 
TEA; Metal Vapor; Diode; Dye; Er:Glass; Er:YAG; Excimer; HeNe; Krypton-Ion; Nd:YAG; Ruby; 
Thulium; HeCd; KrF; Lead Salt; Nd: Glass; Ti:Sapphire; Color-Center; HF/DF; and Holmium YAG. 
Each category can be used in a broader versus narrower range of applications. For instance, a KrF laser 
can be applied to industrial drilling but not to applications in dermatology. An Er:Glass laser technology, 
however, is appropriate for use in dermatology but not in laser drilling. A third alternative, the 
Alexandrite laser, can be used for applications in both dermatology and industrial drilling. Therefore, the 
Alexandrite laser is a more general technology than the KrF or the Er:Glass lasers. To measure the 
generality of the firm technology, we first measure the individual laser’s degree of generality by 
calculating the ratio of the number of uses/markets to which that specific laser type can be applied to the 
total number of applications/markets across all laser types. We then compute the degree of the firm’s 
technology generality in each year by considering the average degree of generality of the lasers in the 
firm’s portfolio. Finally, we measure Investment in general upstream resources as a dummy equal to 1 if 
the firm increases its average laser generality from year t–1 to year t, and 0 otherwise. 
To test hypothesis 1, we estimate (through both bivariate probit and linear probability models) the 
effect, on the joint likelihood of investing in general upstream resources and trading in intermediate 
markets, of the interaction between Downstream production cost and Lack of downstream assets. 
The variable Lack of downstream assets distinguishes between firms that, when deciding to trade 
versus enter a new downstream market, do not already own downstream assets and capabilities and firms 
                                                          
7
 Note that “entry” might mean not only vertical integration for firms that have so far been only upstream players but 
also entry in a new market and thus diversification for firms that are already vertically integrated.  
8
 We computed generality using all 96 specific applications of a laser across the six main markets, to fully capture 
the real generality of a laser. For instance, a laser that can be used in the industrial market, as it can drill and cut, is 
more general than a laser that can only cut: in other words, a firm’s possibility of entering the industrial submarket 
(or of trading the laser in the corresponding intermediate market) is higher when provided the former than the latter 
laser. However, our results are robust to adopting an alternative measure of generality obtained considering whether 
a laser has at least one application per submarket, without counting the exact number of applications. Furthermore, 
as the application table was just available after 1997, for the period 1993–1997 we considered as valid the laser 
applications in 1998. 
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that do. Therefore, this variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm, before a certain year t, was not producing 
and selling laser systems (the downstream product). Since this firm was not active in downstream markets 
before year t, it had no downstream assets or capabilities. To alleviate any potential endogeneity between 
the regulatory change and the decision to vertically integrate, we measured this variable by looking at the 
“status” of the firm in the year immediately before the regulatory change for firms based in states where 
the regulation is issued, and year of entry into the database for firms based in states in which such 
regulation was never issued. 
To test hypothesis 2, we estimate the effect, on the joint likelihood of investing in general upstream 
resources and trading in intermediate markets, of the interaction between Downstream production cost 
and Breadth of demand. The latter variable is calculated by looking at how firms operating in downstream 
markets are distributed across them, for each firm-year. In more detail, for each focal firm in the sample 
that supplies lasers, we consider the markets in which its lasers are potentially applicable, and we 
calculate the variable Breadth of demand as 1 minus the Herfindhal index of concentration of downstream 
buyers across these markets. Note that downstream firms constitute potential buyers for the focal firms’ 
lasers. The value of Breadth of demand is low when potential downstream buyers of the focal firms are 
mostly concentrated in a few markets; it is high when potential downstream buyers are instead equally 
spread across markets. 
Moreover, in all specifications we include as an additional control variable, Number of lasers, that 
controls for the number of different types of lasers produced by the firm. We also control for the Number 
of patents (in hundreds) applied for and granted to the firm in the five years before the focal year, Firm 
size (number of employees, in hundreds), and Firm age. 
 
Results 
Main Results 
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the population of firms in the laser industry between 1993 
and 2001. During this period, about 44% of firms do not have downstream assets (as they are only laser 
suppliers) and 56% do, also producing and selling final laser systems for downstream markets. On 
average, each laser supplier sells two types of lasers and employs about 300 people—even though the 
distribution of employees is skewed. As noted, six states enacted new regulations that increase the costs 
of operating downstream; in our sample, this enactment affects about 20% of our firm-year observations. 
Moreover, about 7% of the suppliers enter new downstream markets, and almost 16% invest in more 
general upstream resources during our time window. 
***** Insert Table 2 about here ***** 
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We first want to show that our shock is relevant, in that it constitutes a relevant increase in 
downstream production costs, pushing fewer laser firms to enter downstream markets and so reducing the 
overall number of downstream manufacturers. That is, we want to show that our shock makes entering 
downstream less convenient than trading in intermediate markets. Therefore, we compute the probabilities 
that in year t a firm operates in intermediate markets selling lasers (measured by the dummy “being in 
intermediate market”) and in downstream markets selling laser systems (measured by the dummy “being 
in downstream market”) as a function of whether the firm used to operate in intermediate markets or 
downstream markets in year t–1, the compliance shock, and the interaction between these variables. In 
doing so, we cover all possible firm types. In fact, in a particular year a firm can operate only in upstream 
intermediate markets (being in intermediate market = 1; being in downstream market = 0), only in 
downstream markets (being in intermediate market = 0; being in downstream market = 1), or in both 
intermediate and downstream markets (being in intermediate market = 1; being in downstream 
market = 1), or it can be out of the industry (being in intermediate market = 0; being in downstream 
market = 0). 
Our bivariate probit in Table 3 and the corresponding marginal effects in Table 4 show that the 
shock prevents the firms so far operating only in upstream intermediate markets from entering 
downstream: the probability that an upstream firm integrates downstream decreases by about 5%. To 
some extent, the change also stops the downstream entry of brand-new companies (firms that were 
outside the industry earlier)—even if the effects are not statistically significant at the conventional levels. 
All in all, this suggests that the regulatory change determines an increase in production costs that acts 
mainly as a barrier to entry. Even though it does not induce the exit of firms already operating 
downstream, the shock lowers the number of downstream producers. 
Consistent with the previous results, Table 5 presents the findings of a Poisson regression in which 
the dependent variable is the number of companies selling laser systems in any state, market, and year. 
After the new regulation, the number of downstream firms in the state affected by the regulation 
diminishes considerably, by about 15%. 
***** Insert Tables 3, 4, & 5 about here ***** 
Having assessed the relevance of our shock as an increase in the costs of operating downstream, we 
can now assess the validity of our theory. According to the results of the seemingly unrelated regression 
linear probability model in Table 6 and the bivariate probit in Table 7, the increase in downstream 
production costs encourages trading (Table 6 and Table 7, column 2) and investment in more general 
upstream resources (Table 6 and Table 7, column 1), even if the latter effect is not significant at the 
conventional level. Furthermore, the impact of the increase in downstream production costs on both the 
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probability of investing in more general upstream resources and the probability of trading is positive for 
firms lacking downstream assets (Table 6 and Table 7, columns 3–4). It is also positive when buyers are 
more equally distributed across markets (Table 6 and Table 7, columns 5–6). 
However, Table 7 provides only the estimates of the effect of our shock on the separate probability 
of investing in generality, on one side, and trading, on the other. Hypotheses 1 and 2 refer instead to the 
effect of the shock on the joint probability of investing in general upstream resources while trading—
which precisely defines the likelihood of adopting a specialization-in-generality strategy. The marginal 
effects of an increase in downstream production costs on the likelihood of pursuing a specialization-in-
generality strategy—as well as on the likelihood of adopting the other strategies defined in Table 1—are 
shown in Table 8. The increase in downstream production costs raises the probability of specializing in 
generality by a technology supplier by about 3%. However, the effect is not very pronounced either 
economically or statistically (p = 0.35; confidence interval [CI]: 0.036–0.1). This is because, as noted in 
the theoretical section, the complementarity between investing in general upstream resource stock and 
trading in intermediate markets depends on the supply and demand conditions that a company faces. 
In line with hypothesis 1, the effect of the shock on the probability of specializing in generality 
(increasing upstream resource generality and trading in intermediated markets) is much larger for firms 
with no downstream assets than for firms that do already have some downstream assets. For firms with no 
downstream assets, this probability increases by more than 10 percentage points—passing from 0.14, 
which is the baseline probability of adopting a specialization-in-generality strategy, to 0.25—and is 
measured more precisely (p = 0.059; CI: −0.004 to 0.21), whereas the probability for firms that do have 
downstream assets does not change. Our results also imply that more than half the firms lacking 
downstream assets would enter the market without the increase in downstream production costs: the 
probability of choosing Investment in general upstream resources = 0 and Trading in intermediate 
markets = 0 decreases by about 4% and the probability of choosing Investment in general upstream 
resources = 1 and Trading in intermediate markets = 0 decreases by about 1%. 
Similarly, as suggested by hypothesis 2, the likelihood of specializing in generality increases when 
buyers’ distribution across markets is more balanced. In particular, when the variable Breadth of demand 
is at the 75th percentile (approximately equal to 0.735, corresponding to a more homogenous distribution 
of buyers across markets), the probability that a firm, after the increase in downstream costs, pursues a 
specialization-in-generality strategy increases by about 13 percentage points (p = 0.001; CI: 0.056–
0.20)—passing from 0.14 to about 0.27. By contrast, when the variable Breadth of demand is at the 25th 
percentile (approximately equal to 0.711, corresponding to a more skewed market distribution in our 
setting), the probability decreases by about 8.5 percentage points (p = 0.003; CI: −0.14 to −0.029). 
***** Insert Tables 6, 7, & 8 about here ***** 
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To better understand these results—and to investigate possible interactions between market and 
supply conditions—we report graphically the effect of an increase in downstream production costs on the 
probability of specializing in generality (Figure 1), for different levels of demand breadth, and for firms 
with and without downstream assets. Figure 1 shows that not only firms without downstream assets but 
also firms with downstream assets seem to choose a strategy of “generality and trading” as the breadth of 
demand across markets increases. This suggests that if the opportunity to profitably sell resources to many 
markets is available, a specialization-in-generality strategy becomes attractive even for firms with 
downstream assets. 
***** Insert Figure 1 about here ***** 
Further on this point, in additional analyses (available upon request) we investigate which firms, of 
those having downstream assets, are more likely to specialize in generality in the presence of high costs of 
downstream production. Interestingly, the results indicate that firm age and size matter. We find that 
younger and smaller firms, even those with downstream assets, are more likely to choose a specialization-
in-generality strategy. These additional results suggest the intriguing possibility—which could be 
investigated by future research—that any shock making trading relatively more convenient than entry 
might induce even some flexible, vertically integrated firms, which can still experiment with their 
strategies, to specialize in generality. In this regard, our findings suggest that corporate experimentation 
may involve not only the choice of which downstream market to operate in (e.g., Kerr et al. 2014) but 
also the decision on the most appropriate business model for serving these markets. 
Robustness Checks 
Comparison between treatment and control groups. An important assumption of any experimental 
and quasi-experimental methodology is that the treatment is exogenous and therefore not systematically 
correlated with firm characteristics. We verify this assumption empirically by analyzing whether firms in 
the treatment and control groups differ along all variables included in our analysis. Specifically, we 
compare the means of the groups in the first year of our sample, before the regulatory changes are 
enacted. Table 9 shows that, overall, the two groups are similar, which corroborates our identification 
assumption. The main difference (in magnitude but not in statistical significance) is in the number of 
patents. However, about two-thirds of the companies in both the treatment and control groups have zero 
patents, and the difference is produced by a few outliers. 
***** Insert Table 9 about here ***** 
Political economy of laser regulation enactment. Based on Table 9, we can conclude that the 
average firm size—which might also proxy for the resources that state firms can spend on lobbying and/or 
campaign contributions—does not differ significantly across firms operating in treated versus control 
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states. This finding should alleviate the concern that the change in regulation is driven by some lobbying 
efforts. However, we perform further controls to check whether the change in regulation is associated 
with any other economic and political characteristics of the states that could affect the business 
environment in general, and the probability of entering into a downstream market and/or investing in 
general upstream resources. To do so, we run a simple linear probability model predicting the likelihood 
of a state enacting a laser regulation as a function of state GDP per capita, the overall taxation level, the 
state political orientation (as proxied by having a “Red” [Republican] governor or having voted for a Red 
U.S. president in the last presidential election), the lobbying activity in the state (as measured by the 
number of establishments classified by the County Business Patterns as “political organizations” [SIC 
code 8651]; Sobel and Garrett 2002), the laser industry agglomeration (as measured by the number of 
firms producing lasers in the state), the presence of a dominant firm (as measured by a dummy equal to 1 
if in the state there is a company in the top 10% of the laser-firm-size distribution), and the number of 
major laser accidents per capita. To measure the latter variable we used Factiva to collect the number of 
news articles containing the word “laser” together with the word “accident” published in each state and 
each year in our sample. We randomly selected a sample of the articles that emerged from this search to 
verify that the search process employed was appropriate for the purpose. We used the number of news 
articles in each state and year as a proxy for the occurrence as well as the salience of the laser accidents. 
No predictor shows any significant correlation with the probability of enacting the new regulation, which 
reinforces our identification strategy (see Table 10). 
***** Insert Table 10 about here ***** 
Relaxing the parallel-paths assumption. A specific assumption of the quasi-experimental diff-in-
diff approach is the so-called parallel-paths assumption. This assumption implies that, for the diff-in-diff 
estimation to indicate the real impact of the treatment, the outcome variable should exhibit a similar trend 
for individuals in the treatment and control groups. As indicated by Angrist and Pischke (2009), a simple 
way of relaxing this assumption is to introduce an interaction term in the diff-in-diff regression, that is, 
the interaction between a dummy for treated units and a time trend. This interaction captures any 
differential trend between treated and control units before the treatment. We adopt this approach to check 
whether our results are robust to the inclusion of a different time trend for each state. Unfortunately, 
including this variable in the bivariate probit makes the estimation impossible. Hence, we use a linear 
probability model, where the dependent variables are the four possible strategies resulting from the 
combinations of investing in more general upstream resources (or not) and trading exclusively in 
intermediate markets (vs. entering downstream). The results are again largely consistent with our theory. 
The likelihood that a firm invests in more general upstream resources and trades in intermediate markets 
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(which represents the specialization-in-generality strategy and is reported in columns 10–12 of Table 11) 
increases for firms without downstream assets and for firms whose potential buyers are equally 
distributed across markets (such that the demand is broad). 
***** Insert Table 11 about here ***** 
Inclusion of firm fixed effects. An additional concern of the main analyses is the presence of some 
firm-unobserved characteristics, which we do not control for in the bivariate probit model. Overall, we 
believe this is not a major concern, as we show that our shock is arguably exogenous—and thus 
uncorrelated with both time-variant and time-invariant firm characteristics. Moreover, a fixed-effect 
model would rely only on within-firm variation in the likelihood of entering a downstream market and/or 
investing in general upstream resources, whereas most variation is across firms. However, we also check 
whether our results change when we introduce firm fixed effects in the previous linear probability model. 
Table 12 shows that the main results are robust to the inclusion of firm-specific dummies (columns 10–
12). 
***** Insert Table 12 about here ***** 
Log specification. We also checked to what extent our results are robust to alternative 
specifications. In particular, we considered a specification where firm size, age, number of patents, and 
number of lasers are logged. Table 13 shows that the main results are confirmed. After an increase in 
downstream costs, firms lacking downstream complementary assets and facing a broad demand are more 
likely to specialize in generality (Table 13, columns 1–3). 
***** Insert Table 13 about here ***** 
Stable unit treated value assumption (SUTVA). One possible concern is that our shock, by 
inducing some firms to move across states, might change the composition of the treated and control 
groups—which would violate the SUTVA and therefore bias our estimates. However, this is not the case. 
In Table 14 (column 1) we find that the costs associated with stricter regulation are not high enough to 
convince the firms in our sample to change states—which would represent a dramatic change. The 
enactment of a regulation increasing the cost of producing downstream is not significantly associated with 
any firm move. Furthermore, our results hold even when we exclude from our sample the few firms that, 
for some reason, moved to different states over time (Table 14, columns 2–4). 
***** Insert Table 14 about here ***** 
Conclusions 
The thrust of our analysis is that, under some supply and demand conditions, the organizational decision 
of a firm to trade in intermediate markets complements the decision to increase the generality of its 
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resources to reach different markets. This complementarity reflects the firm’s willingness to grow in 
intermediate markets in order to overcome the limitations of growth in downstream markets. The market 
development manager of a large international laser company summarizes our approach: “Our lasers can 
be applied to any type of industry. What I tell our customers is ‘I do not care what you need to make with 
it: I have the laser for you!’ [. . .] We have developed this skill through the years. We do not need to move 
into systems. Some companies do but it is not our business concept.” 
Our study treats investment in upstream resource generality and resource exploitation modes 
(which could occur by entering new downstream markets vs. trading in intermediate markets) as distinct 
but interrelated and endogenous choices. In so doing, it offers both theoretical and empirical 
contributions. From a theoretical point of view, our paper contributes to the organizational research on 
vertical integration and disintegration (e.g., Baldwin and Clark 2000, Kapoor 2013). In particular, we 
contribute to the research stream showing how a firm’s vertical scope is intertwined with its upstream 
resources and capabilities (Jacobides and Winter 2005, Argyres and Zenger 2012). We add to this 
research by focusing on a defined characteristic of firms’ resource stock: its generality. This feature has 
been neglected by previous studies focusing on firms’ resource-stock superiority (Jacobides and Winter 
2005) or internal complementarity (Argyres and Zenger 2012). Moreover, different from prior studies, 
which take characteristics of extant resource stock as given, we consider instead that firms can choose to 
make investments that change the characteristics of their resource stock, in order to implement a new 
strategy. By adding a new dimension (resource generality) and introducing the idea that firms can 
purposefully manipulate this dimension, our study generates novel and alternative predictions. For 
instance, prior research identifies an association between resource superiority and trading (Jacobides and 
Winter 2005). We instead argue that, in the case of resource generality, such superior ability to serve 
multiple markets might lead to vertical integration (rather than specialization) when a firm already has 
downstream capabilities and/or faces deep intermediate demand. Similarly, prior research suggests that 
firms endowed with general resources, unlikely to be the source of “unique complementarities,” are 
unlikely to vertically integrate (Argyres and Zenger 2012). We instead argue that, under specific supply 
and demand conditions, firms might decide to enhance their generality to enter downstream. 
Second, this paper contributes to the stream of literature on generality and markets for technologies 
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995, Bresnahan and Gambardella 1998, Gambardella and McGahan, 2010). 
Prior research in this domain has emphasized that upstream technological resource generality determines 
the development of markets for technologies, by inducing firms to trade the services or products in 
multiple intermediate markets. However, much of this research has overlooked the strategic challenge 
associated with this choice, taking the generality of firm resources as given and neglecting that a general 
resource might also be profitably used for entry. This paper, instead, explores the trade-off that firms face 
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when deciding whether to invest in generality, suggesting that the optimal choice is intertwined not only 
with the decision about resource exploitation mode (via trading in intermediate markets vs. entering 
downstream markets) but also with supply and demand conditions. 
Finally, our paper contributes to the research on organizational complementarities and firm strategic 
choices. Indeed, we show how a strategy can emerge and persist precisely because of complementarity 
between organizational activities (e.g., Galbraith 1973, Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Thompson 1967). 
Furthermore, we stress the empirical importance of recognizing complementarity between vertical scope 
and capability development choices, to overcome the natural estimation bias that arises by considering 
either the former or the latter choice as exogenous. In this regard, future research analyzing, for instance, 
firm entry into a new market as a function of resource-stock characteristics should adopt appropriate 
identification strategies (e.g., instrumental variables for the resource-stock characteristics) to obtain 
reliable estimates. 
Our paper is also defined by its limitations. First, as in any quasi-experimental setting, we cannot 
argue that our treatment is completely exogenous and thus uncorrelated with other factors potentially 
affecting our outcome of interest. However, the several robustness checks we conducted tend to 
corroborate the idea that we can consider the treatment to be exogenous. Related to this, our treatment 
might have affected some firms more than others. This issue might have created some bias in the 
estimates and, in particular, might have reduced the precision of the estimated coefficients. However, 
there are no evident statistical reasons for this issue to bias the sign or magnitude of our estimated 
coefficient and thus the direction of our findings.  
Second, a single-industry study generates concerns about the generalizability of the results. In 
particular, some characteristics of the laser industry might not extend to other sectors. Several of the 
industry’s characteristics—including the division of innovative labor—are common across knowledge-
intensive industries, though. For this reason, other scholars have chosen this industry as an empirical 
setting for their theoretical predictions (e.g., Klepper and Sleeper 2005). However, it would be useful for 
future research to explore further our theoretical predictions in different industries. This is also important 
because a specialization-in-generality strategy might be more viable in more mature industries, where 
firms might be more likely to identify suitable downstream buyers. In contrast, such strategy might be 
less viable in nascent industries, where the availability of suitable downstream buyers might be limited 
(Meade et al. 2018).  
Third, for testing complementarity we relied on the so-called adoption approach (Brynjolfsson and 
Milgrom 2012). Hence, we assessed whether activities predicted to be complementary are actually shown 
to be so in the choice data. This approach crucially hinges on the assumption that firms are rational and 
recognize the value of complementarity. Future research might assess the complementarity between 
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trading in intermediate markets and investing in generality by using the “productivity approach”—that is, 
by assessing how the joint adoption of those two activities affects firm economic performance. Finally, 
our analysis assumes that the complementarity benefits mainly manifest when firms simultaneously 
undertake the focal activities of our study. Most studies on complementarity between activities make the 
same assumption (e.g., Cassiman and Valentini 2016). Yet, some complementarity value might be 
realized when activities are undertaken sequentially rather than simultaneously. Further work might 
assess to what extent it is in the case of investment in generality and trading. 
Despite these limitations, this paper provides relevant implications for practitioners. In particular, 
specialization in generality is a natural prescription of our discussion. Translating Stigler’s (1951) 
intuition into the business environment, we argue that, under certain contingencies, managers may find it 
more profitable to develop a general upstream resource to serve different downstream markets as an 
upstream supplier of intermediate products or services than to enter any one of these markets. In this 
regard, while Penrose (1959), Chandler (1990), or Nelson (1959) saw economies of scope mostly as 
accruing within—usually large—organizations, in this paper we suggest that the benefits of economies of 
scope can be achieved (also) through markets and the division of innovative labor (Arora et al. 2001). 
Studying the extent to which firms can take advantage of internal economies of scope to enter multiple 
markets, rather than exploiting external economics of scope by selling in these markets, is an interesting 
avenue for future research. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 Typology of Strategies and Payoffs When Intermediate Markets Operate Efficiently 
 Trading = 0 Trading = 1 
Investment in 
generality = 0 
П(0,0) = ПE П(0,1) = ПT  
Investment in 
generality = 1 
П(1,0) = ПEG П(1,1) = ПTG 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations between Variables 
Variable Observations Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
     
    
    Investment in general upstream 
resources 
783 0.157 0.364 0.000 1.000 1.000     
Trading in intermediate markets 783 0.932 0.251 0.000 1.000 −0.037 1.000            
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 1,  
Trading in intermediate 
markets = 0 
783 0.014 0.118 0.000 1.000 0.277 −0.443 1.000           
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 1,  
Trading in intermediate 
markets = 1 
783 0.143 0.350 0.000 1.000 0.946 0.110 −0.049 1.000          
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 0,  
Trading in intermediate 
markets = 1 
783 0.789 0.408 0.000 1.000 −0.836 0.522 −0.231 −0.791 1.000         
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 0,  
Trading in intermediate 
markets = 0 
783 0.054 0.225 0.000 1.000 −0.103 −0.884 −0.028 −0.097 −0.461 1.000        
Downstream production cost 783 0.202 0.402 0.000 1.000 0.037 0.072 −0.033 0.049 0.002 −0.063 1.000       
Number of lasers  783 1.927 1.514 1.000 12.000 0.169 −0.110 0.149 0.126 −0.176 0.045 −0.058 1.000      
Number of patents  783 0.461 3.383 0 49.419 0.058 0.030 −0.010 0.064 −0.036 −0.029 −0.066 −0.057 1.000     
Firm size  783 3.366 13.796 0.01 217.6 0.164 −0.013 0.062 0.149 −0.136 −0.018 −0.032 0.326 0.264 1.000    
Firm age 783 20.789 18.831 2.000 134.000 0.031 0.006 0.056 0.013 −0.007 −0.036 0.038 0.094 0.195 0.363 1.000   
Breadth of demand 783 0.690 0.120 0.000 0.749 0.126 −0.042 0.038 0.118 −0.127 0.026 0.088 0.148 0.017 0.029 0.095 1.000  
Lack of downstream assets 783 0.439 0.497 0.000 1.000 0.085 0.064 −0.040 0.101 −0.047 −0.051 0.017 −0.138 0.019 −0.034 0.042 −0.002 1.000 
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Table 3 Impact of Increased Downstream Production Costs on the Probability of Being in 
Intermediate and/or Downstream Markets: Bivariate Probit Estimation 
Variables 
(1) 
Being in intermediate 
markets (t) 
(2) 
Being in downstream 
markets (t) 
Downstream production cost (t−1) 0.026 −0.072 
 (0.132) (0.102) 
Downstream production cost (t−1) × Being in downstream markets 
(t−1) 
0.072 0.350*** 
 (0.153) (0.125) 
Downstream production cost (t−1) × Being in intermediate markets 
(t−1) 
−0.016 −0.194 
 (0.176) (0.146) 
Being in downstream markets (t−1) −0.362*** 1.770*** 
 (0.066) (0.047) 
Being in intermediate markets (t−1) 2.507*** −0.090 
 (0.073) (0.066) 
Year fixed effects Included Included 
State fixed effects Included Included 
  
 
Observations 5,533 5,533 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 4 Impact of Increased Downstream Production Costs on the Probability of Being in Intermediate and/or in Downstream 
Markets: Marginal Effect Estimation (Based on the Bivariate Probit Estimation in Table 3) 
  ON THE PROBABILITY OF BEING, at t: 
Effect size when  
downstream 
production 
cost = 0 
Effect size when  
downstream 
production cost = 1 
Difference between 
marginal effects 
Prob > 
chi2 
Outside the industry U(t−1) = 0 D(t−1) = 0 Outside the industry U(t) = 0 D(t) = 0 0.825 *** 0.837 *** 0.012  0.607 
Outside the industry U(t−1) = 0 D(t−1) = 0 In intermediate markets only U(t) = 1 D(t) = 0 0.027 *** 0.03 *** 0.003  0.6669 
Outside the industry U(t−1) = 0 D(t−1) = 0 In downstream markets only U(t) = 0 D(t) = 1 0.115 *** 0.1 *** −0.015  0.4053 
Outside the industry U(t−1) = 0 D(t−1) = 0 In both intermediate and 
downstream markets 
U(t) = 1 D(t) = 1 0.033 *** 0.032 *** −0.001  0.9141 
In intermediate markets only  U(t−1) = 1 D(t−1) = 0 Outside the industry U(t) = 0 D(t) = 0 0.202 *** 0.202 *** 0.000  0.992 
In intermediate markets only  U(t−1) = 1 D(t−1) = 0 In intermediate markets only U(t) = 1 D(t) = 0 0.669 *** 0.716 *** 0.047  0.3158 
In intermediate markets only  U(t−1) = 1 D(t−1) = 0 In downstream markets only U(t) = 0 D(t) = 1 0.005 *** 0.003 *** −0.002 * 0.0829 
In intermediate markets only  U(t−1) = 1 D(t−1) = 0 In both intermediate and 
downstream markets 
U(t) = 1 D(t) = 1 0.124 *** 0.079 *** −0.045 * 0.057 
In downstream markets only U(t−1) = 0 D(t−1) = 1 Outside the industry U(t) = 0 D(t) = 0 0.242 *** 0.166 *** −0.076 *** 0.0093 
In downstream markets only U(t−1) = 0 D(t−1) = 1 In intermediate markets only U(t) = 1 D(t) = 0 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000  0.1489 
In downstream markets only U(t−1) = 0 D(t−1) = 1 In downstream markets only U(t) = 0 D(t) = 1 0.729 *** 0.799 *** 0.070 ** 0.0173 
In downstream markets only U(t−1) = 0 D(t−1) = 1 In both intermediate and 
downstream markets 
U(t) = 1 D(t) = 1 0.029 *** 0.035 *** 0.006  0.5718 
In both intermediate and 
downstream markets 
U(t−1) = 1 D(t−1) = 1 Outside the industry U(t) = 0 D(t) = 0 0.162 *** 0.142 *** −0.02  0.5573 
In both intermediate and 
downstream markets 
U(t−1) = 1 D(t−1) = 1 In intermediate markets only U(t) = 1 D(t) = 0 0.109 *** 0.103 *** −0.006  0.7676 
In both intermediate and 
downstream markets 
U(t−1) = 1 D(t−1) = 1 In downstream markets only U(t) = 0 D(t) = 1 0.151 *** 0.146 *** −0.005  0.8432 
In both intermediate and 
downstream markets 
U(t−1) = 1 D(t−1) = 1 In both intermediate and 
downstream markets 
U(t) = 1 D(t) = 1 0.577 *** 0.61 *** 0.033  0.5739 
Note. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 5 Impact of Increased Downstream Production Costs on the Number of Firms Operating 
Downstream: Poisson Estimation 
Variables 
(1) 
Number of downstream firms 
Downstream production cost −0.154** 
 (0.057) 
Market dummies Included 
Year fixed effects Included 
State fixed effects Included 
Observations 3,330 
R-squared 0.887 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 6 Impact of Increased Downstream Production Costs on the Probability of Investing in More General Upstream Resources 
and/or Trading in Intermediate Markets: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Investment in general 
upstream resources 
(vs. No investment) 
Trading in intermediate 
markets 
(vs. Entering 
downstream markets) 
Investment in general 
upstream resources 
(vs. No investment) 
Trading in intermediate 
markets 
(vs. Entering 
downstream markets) 
Investment in general 
upstream resources 
(vs. No investment) 
Trading in intermediate 
markets 
(vs. Entering 
downstream markets) 
Downstream production cost 0.030 0.037* −0.012 0.032* −0.823*** −0.075 
 (0.041) (0.022) (0.040) (0.016) (0.170) (0.053) 
Lack of downstream assets   0.049*** 0.029   
   (0.017) (0.019)   
Downstream production cost × Lack 
of downstream assets 
  0.106 0.014   
   (0.081) (0.028)   
Breadth of demand     0.328*** −0.110*** 
     (0.054) (0.042) 
Downstream production cost × 
Breadth of demand 
    1.219*** 0.158* 
     (0.224) (0.082) 
Number of lasers  0.047*** 0.000 0.049*** 0.001 0.042*** 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) 
Number of patents  0.005 0.003*** 0.005 0.003*** 0.004 0.003*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Firm size 0.003** -0.000 0.003*** -0.000 0.003** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm age −0.001* −0.000 −0.002* −0.000 −0.002** −0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
State fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 783 783 783 783 783 783 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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Table 7 Impact of Increased Downstream Production Costs on the Probability of Investing in More General Upstream Resources 
and/or Trading in Intermediate Markets: Bivariate Probit Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Investment in general 
upstream resources 
(vs. No investment) 
Trading in 
intermediate markets 
(vs. Entering 
downstream markets) 
Investment in general 
upstream resources 
(vs. No investment) 
Trading in 
intermediate markets 
(vs. Entering 
downstream markets) 
Investment in general 
upstream resources 
(vs. No investment) 
Trading in 
intermediate markets 
(vs. Entering 
downstream markets) 
Downstream production cost 0.137 0.419* −0.047 0.230 −39.252*** 0.047 
 (0.176) (0.215) (0.206) (0.167) (8.230) (0.720) 
Lack of downstream assets   0.236* 0.237   
   (0.123) (0.167)   
Downstream production cost × Lack of downstream assets   0.455 4.892***   
   (0.320) (0.240)   
Breadth of demand     5.970*** −1.033*** 
     (2.227) (0.356) 
Downstream production cost × Breadth of demand     54.161*** 0.490 
     (11.196) (0.957) 
Number of lasers  0.188*** 0.019 0.206*** 0.022 0.186*** 0.025 
 (0.052) (0.029) (0.055) (0.030) (0.067) (0.031) 
Number of patents  0.027*** 0.066*** 0.027*** 0.063*** 0.026*** 0.069*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Firm size 0.012*** -0.001 0.012*** -0.000 0.011** -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Firm age −0.009* −0.006 −0.009* −0.005 −0.009** −0.005 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
State fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 783 783 783 783 783 783 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 8 Impact of Increased Downstream Production Costs on the Probability of Investing in More General Upstream Resources 
and/or Trading in Intermediate Markets: Bivariate Probit Marginal Effect Estimation 
MARGINAL EFFECT OF: ON THE JOINT PROBABILITIES OF: 
Downstream production cost 
Investment  
in general upstream 
resources 
(vs. No investment) 
Trading in intermediate 
markets  
(vs. Entering in 
downstream markets) Effect size p-value 
 1 0 −0.006 * 0.098 
 0 0 −0.032 ** 0.011 
 0 1 0.006  0.839 
 1 1 0.032  0.354 
WHEN:  
Lack of downstream assets is equal to: 
    
0 (Firm with downstream assets) 1 0 −0.005 0.290 
0 (Firm with downstream assets) 0 0 −0.022 0.117 
0 (Firm with downstream assets) 0 1 0.029 0.440 
0 (Firm with downstream assets) 1 1 −0.002 0.935 
1 (Firm lacks downstream assets) 1 0 −0.014 ** 0.007 
1 (Firm lacks downstream assets) 0 0 −0.043 *** 0.000 
1 (Firm lacks downstream assets) 0 1 −0.048 0.405 
1 (Firm lacks downstream assets) 1 1 0.105 * 0.059 
WHEN:  
Breadth of demand is equal to: 
    
25% (More concentrated distribution) 1 0 −0.011 *** 0.001 
25% (More concentrated distribution) 0 0 −0.026 * 0.085 
25% (More concentrated distribution) 0 1 0.122 *** 0.000 
25% (More concentrated distribution) 1 1 −0.085 *** 0.003 
75% (More equally spread distribution) 1 0 −0.003 0.624 
75% (More equally spread distribution) 0 0 −0.037 *** 0.001 
75% (More equally spread distribution) 0 1 −0.088 ** 0.014 
75% (More equally spread distribution) 1 1 0.128 *** 0.001 
Note. The coefficients representing the effect on the likelihood of adopting a specialization-in-generality strategy (investment in general upstream resources = 1; 
trading in intermediate markets = 1) indicated in bold. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
 39 
Table 9 Comparison of Treated and Control Groups 
 
Average  
control group 
Average  
treated group Difference p-value 
Number of lasers  1.660 1.817 −0.157 0.4161 
Number of patents  0.672 0.014 0.658 0.1886 
Firm size  3.055 2.475 0.580 0.7282 
Firm age  19.271 16.483 2.788 0.3596 
Lack of downstream assets 0.424 0.483 −0.060 0.4362 
Breadth of demand 0.666 0.691 −0.025 0.2834 
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Table 10 Impact of State Economic and Political Characteristics on the Probability of Enacting a New Laser Regulation 
Variables 
(1) 
New laser 
regulation 
(2) 
New laser 
regulation 
(3) 
New laser 
regulation 
(4) 
New laser 
regulation 
(5) 
New laser 
regulation 
(6) 
New laser 
regulation 
Number of firms    0.001  0.001 
    (0.001)  (0.001) 
Presence of a dominant firm (top 10% in terms of size)    0.024  0.024 
    (0.017)  (0.017) 
Number of laser accidents per capita     0.022 0.022 
     (0.028) (0.028) 
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Red presidential elections 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.028 0.019 0.027 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) 
Red governor −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Taxation level  −0.882 −0.896 −1.030 −0.987 −1.120 
  (0.782) (0.809) (0.838) (0.866) (0.888) 
Number of lobbying establishments   −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
State fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 
R-squared 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.047 0.046 0.054 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 11 Impact of Increased Downstream Production Costs on the Probability of Pursuing Different Strategies: OLS Estimation 
Including Time Trend 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 1,  
Trading in intermediate markets = 0 
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 0,  
Trading in intermediate markets = 0 
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 0,  
Trading in intermediate markets = 1 
Specialization in Generality: 
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 1,  
Trading in intermediate markets = 1 
Downstream production cost −0.011 −0.014 0.043 −0.070** −0.067** −0.012 0.036 0.099 0.947*** 0.041 −0.022 −0.955*** 
 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.045) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.053) (0.087) (0.138) (0.052) (0.078) (0.142) 
Lack of downstream assets 
 
−0.009 
  
−0.028* 
 
 −0.001   0.037*  
  
(0.011) 
  
(0.017) 
 
 (0.034)   (0.022)  
Downstream production cost × Lack 
of downstream assets 
 
0.008 
  
−0.009 
 
 −0.156   0.155*  
  
(0.012) 
  
(0.029) 
 
 (0.099)   (0.089)  
Breadth of demand 
  
0.052 
  
0.074***   −0.388***   0.286*** 
   
(0.051) 
  
(0.022)   (0.066)   (0.059) 
Downstream production cost × 
Breadth of demand 
  
−0.074 
  
−0.080   −1.286***   1.404*** 
   
(0.062) 
  
(0.050)   (0.212)   (0.191) 
Number of lasers  0.010 0.010 0.009 −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.033** −0.034** −0.028* 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Number of patents  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm size  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm age 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
States fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Time trend × States dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 
R-squared 0.073 0.074 0.101 0.104 0.102 0.186 0.189 0.206 0.126 0.234 0.243 0.254 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 12 Impact of Increased Downstream Production Costs on the Probability of Pursuing Different Strategies: OLS Estimation 
Including Time Trend and Firm Fixed Effects 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 1,  
Trading in intermediate markets = 0 
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 0,  
Trading in intermediate markets = 0 
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 0,  
Trading in intermediate markets = 1 
Specialization in Generality: 
Investment in general upstream 
resources = 1,  
Trading in intermediate markets = 1  
Downstream production 
cost 
−0.009 −0.020 −0.004 −0.039 −0.109 0.206* 0.030 0.316** 1.859** 0.018 −0.187 −2.061** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.078) (0.045) (0.066) (0.114) (0.061) (0.140) (0.896) (0.051) (0.128) (0.857) 
Downstream production 
cost × Lack of 
downstream assets 
 0.027   0.168***   −0.690***   0.495***  
  (0.020)   (0.049)   (0.187)   (0.179)  
Breadth of demand   −0.011   −0.188**   −0.318   0.517** 
   (0.014)   (0.084)   (0.331)   (0.253) 
Downstream production 
cost × Breadth of 
demand 
  −0.006   −0.338**   −2.527*   2.871** 
   (0.109)   (0.154)   (1.250)   (1.204) 
Number of lasers  0.009 0.009 0.009 −0.036*** −0.036*** −0.035*** 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.023 0.023 0.022 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) 
Number of patents  0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002** 0.010 0.009 0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Firm size  -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 0.007* 0.006** 0.007* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm age −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** −0.104*** −0.103*** −0.103*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
States fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Time trend × States 
dummies 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 
R-squared 0.073 0.074 0.073 0.064 0.070 0.067 0.120 0.150 0.126 0.169 0.191 0.185 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 13 Impact of Increased Downstream Production Costs on the Probability of Pursuing a 
Specialization in Generality Strategy: Linear-Log Specification 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Specialization in Generality 
Investment in general upstream resources = 1,  
Trading in intermediate markets = 1 
Downstream production cost 0.031 −0.170 −2.200*** 
 (0.059) (0.143) (0.705) 
Downstream production cost × Lack of downstream assets  0.488**  
  (0.183)  
Breadth of demand   0.454* 
   (0.250) 
Downstream production cost × Breadth of demand   3.078*** 
   (1.005) 
Log number of lasers  0.151 0.159 0.166 
 (0.106) (0.097) (0.102) 
Log number of patents  −0.019 −0.008 −0.029 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.029) 
Log firm size  0.065* 0.043 0.062* 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) 
Log firm age 0.179 0.191* 0.155 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.110) 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
States fixed effects Included Included Included 
Time trend × States dummies Included Included Included 
Observations 783 783 783 
R-squared 0.181 0.201 0.196 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 14 Laser Regulation and Firm Mobility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Move to another 
state 
Specialization in 
generality 
(subsample of 
non-moving 
firms) 
Specialization in 
generality 
(subsample of 
non-moving 
firms) 
Specialization in 
generality 
(subsample of 
non-moving 
firms) 
Downstream production cost 0.019 0.065** −0.098 −1.637*** 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.075) (0.567) 
Downstream production cost × Lack of downstream assets   0.501**  
   (0.223)  
Breadth of demand    0.548* 
    (0.280) 
Downstream production cost × Breadth of demand    2.370*** 
    (0.746) 
Number of lasers  −0.014** 0.024 0.025 0.022 
 (0.006) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027) 
Number of patents  0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Firm size -0.000 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm age 0.001 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
State fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
     
Observations 783 719 719 719 
R-squared 0.017 0.119 0.139 0.136 
Note. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Figure 1 Effect of an Increase in Downstream Production Costs on the Probability of 
Specializing in Generality for Different Levels of Demand Breadth 
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